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Differential Decision Systems with
Decentralized Noiseless Feedback Information
Structures via Girsanov’s Measure
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Charalambos D. Charalambous
Abstract
In this paper we generalized static team theory to dynamic team theory, in the context of stochastic
differential decision system with decentralized noiseless feedback information structures.
We apply Girsanov’s theorem to transformed the initial stochastic dynamic team problem to an
equivalent team problem, under a reference probability space, with state process and information
structures independent of any of the team decisions. Subsequently, we show, under certain conditions, that
continuous-time and discrete-time stochastic dynamic team problems, can be transformed to equivalent
static team problems, although computing the optimal team strategies using this method might be
computational intensive. Therefore, we propose an alternative method, by deriving team and Person-by-
Person (PbP) optimality conditions, via the stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle, consisting of
forward and backward stochastic differential equations, and a set of conditional variational Hamiltonians
with respect to the information structures of the team members.
Finally, we relate the backward stochastic differential equation to the value process of the stochastic
team problem.
C.D. Charalambous is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Cyprus, Nicosia 1678
(E-mail: chadcha@ucy.ac.cy).
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In classical stochastic control or decision theory the control actions or decisions applied by
the multiple controllers or Decision Makers (DM) are based on the same information. The
underlying assumption is that the acquisition of information is centralized, or the information
collected at different observation posts is communicated to each controller or DMs. Classical
stochastic control problems are often classified, based on the information available for control
actions, into fully observable [1]–[7] and partially observable [2], [5], [8]. Fully, observable refers
to the case when the information structure or pattern available for control actions is generated
by the state process (also called feedback information) or the exogenous state noise process
(also called nonanticipative information), and partially observable refers to the case when the
information structure available for control actions is a nonlinear function of the state process
corrupted by exogenous observation noise process.
In this paper, we deviate from the classical stochastic control or decision formulation by
consider a system operating over a finite time period [0, T ], with the following features.
1) There are N observation posts or stations collecting information;
2) There are N control stations, each having direct access to information collected by at most
one observation post, without delay;
3) The observation stations may not communicate their information to the other control
stations, or they may communicate their information to the other control stations by
signaling part or all of their information to some of the control stations with delay;
4) The N control stations may not have perfect recall, that is, information which is available
at any of the control stations at time t ∈ [0, T ) may not be available at any future time
τ ≥ t, τ ∈ (0, T ];
5) The control strategies applied at the N control stations have to be coordinated to optimize
a common pay-off or reward.
In the above formulation we have assumed that one observation post is serving one control
station without delay, and we allowed the possibility that a subset of the other observation posts
signal their information to any of the control stations they are not serving subject to delay. Such
signaling among the observation posts and control stations is called information sharing [9]–[12].
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3The elements of the proposed system of study are the following.
ZN
△
=
{
1, 2, . . . , N
}
: Set of observation posts/control stations;
x : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rn : Unobserved state process;
W : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rn : State exogenous Brownian Motion (BM) process;
For i = 1, . . . , N,
ui : [0, T ] −→ Ai : Control process with action space Ai ⊆ Rdi applied at the ith control station;
zi : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Rki : Distributed observation process collected at the ith observation post;
hi : [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rn) −→ Rki : Information functional generating zi at the ith observation post;
Uz
i
[0, T ] : Admissible strategies generating the control actions at the ith control station
based on {zi(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]};
J : A(N) −→ (−∞,∞] : Team pay-off or reward.
We call as usual the information available as arguments of the control laws, which generate the
control actions applied at the N control stations, “information Structure or Pattern”.
Suppose, for now, there is no signaling of information from the observation posts to any of the
control station they are not serving, and let {zi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} denote the observation available
to the ith control station to generate the control actions {uit : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} for i = 1, . . . , N .
Denote the corresponding control strategies by Uzi[0, T ], for i = 1, . . . , N . Given the control
strategies, the performance of the collective decisions or control actions applied by the control
stations, the stochastic differential decision system is formulated using dynamic team theory, as
follows.
inf
{
J(u1, . . . , uN) : (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ ×Ni=1U
zi[0, T ]
}
, (1)
J(u1, . . . , uN) = EPΩ
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), u1t (z
1), . . . , uNt (z
N ))dt+ ϕ(x(T ))
}
, (2)
subject to stochastic Itoˆ differential dynamics and distributed noiseless observations
dx(t) =f(t, x(t), u1t (z
1), . . . , uNt (z
N ))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (3)
zi(t) =hi(t, x), t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N, (4)
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4where EPΩ denotes expectation with respect to an underlying probability space
(
Ω,F,PΩ
)
. The
stochastic system (3) may be a compact representation of many interconnected subsystems with
states {xi ∈ Rni : i = 1, . . . , N}, n
△
=
∑N
i=1 ni, aggregated into a single state representation x ∈
Rn, where xi represents the state of the local subsystem, {zi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} its local distributed
observation process collected at the ith local observation post, and {uit(zi) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} its local
control process applied at the ith local control station, such that for each t ∈ [0, T ], the control
law is uit(zi) ≡ µit({zi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}), a nonanticipative measurable function µit(·) of the ith
control station information structure {zi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, for i = 1, . . . , N .
We often call the stochastic differential decision system (1)-(4) with decentralized noiseless
feedback information structures, {z1(t), z2(t), . . . , zN (t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, a stochastic dynamic
team problem, and a strategy uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ ×Ni=1Uz
i
[0, T ] which achieves the
infimum in (1) a team optimal strategy.
Moreover, we call uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ ×Ni=1Uz
i
[0, T ] a PbP optimal strategy if
J(u1,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ J(u1,o, . . . , ui−1,o, ui, ui+1,o, . . . , uN,o), ∀ui ∈ Ui[0, T ], ∀i = 1, . . . , N, (5)
and the infimum subject to constraints (3), (4) is achieved. In team theory terminology {u1, . . . , uN}
are called the DMs, agents or members of the team game.
In this paper, we investigate the stochastic dynamic team problem (1)-(4), and its generalization
when, there is information sharing from the observation posts to any of the control stations, and
there is no perfect recall of information at the control stations.
Recall that a stochastic team problem is called a “Static Team Problem” if the information
structures available for decisions are not affected by any of the team decisions. Optimality
conditions for static team problems are developed by Marschak and Radner [13]–[15], and
subsequently generalized in [16]. Clearly, since the information structures {zi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤
T}, i = 1, . . . , N generated by (4) are affected by the team decisions via the state process
{x(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} generated by (3), the static team theory optimality conditions given in
[13]–[16] donot apply.
On the other hand, stochastic optimal control theory with full information is developed under a
centralized assumption on the information structures. Therefore, a natural question is whether any
of these techniques developed over the last 60 years for centralized stochastic control problems
and dynamic games, such as, dynamic programming, stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle,
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5and martingale methods are applicable to stochastic dynamic team problems, and if so how.
In this paper we apply techniques from classical strochastic control theory to generalize
Marschak’s and Radner’s static team theory [13]–[15] to continuous-time stochastic differential
decision systems with decentralized noiseless feedback information structures, defined by (1)-
(4). Moreover, we discuss generalizations of (1)-(4), when there is information sharing from the
observation posts to any of the control stations, and there is no perfect recall of information at
the control stations. Our methodology is based on deriving team and PbP optimality conditions,
using stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle, by utilizing the semi martingale representation
method due to Bismut [3], under a weak formulation of the probability space by invoking
Girsanov’s theorem [17]. First, we apply Girsanov’s theorem to transform the original stochastic
dynamic team problem to an equivalent team problem, under a reference probability space in
which the state process and the information structures are not affected by any the team deci-
sions. Subsequently, we show the precise connection between Girsanov’s measure transformation
and Witsenhausen’s notion of “Common Denominator Condition” and “Change of Variables”
introduced in [18] to establish equivalence between static and dynamic team problems. We
elaborate on this connection for both continuous-time and discrete-time stochastic systems, and
we state certain results from static team theory which are directly applicable. However, since
the computation of the optimal team strategies via static team theory might be computationally
intensive, we proceed further to derive optimality conditions based on stochastic variational
methods, by taking advantage of the fact that under the reference measure, the state process and
the information structures do not react to any perturbations of the team decisions. The optimality
conditions are given by a “Hamiltonian System” consisting of a backward and forward stochastic
differential equations, while the optimal team actions of the ith team member are determined by
a conditional variational Hamiltonian, conditioned on the information structure of the ith team
member, while the rest are fixed to their optimal values, for i = 1, . . . , N . Finally, we show the
connection between the backward stochastic differential equation and the value process of the
stochastic dynamic team problem.
We point out that the approach we pursued in this paper is different from the various ap-
proaches pursued over the years to address stochastic dynamic decentralized decision systems,
formulated using team theory in [10]–[12], [16], [18]–[45], and our recent treatment in [46].
Compared to [46], in the current paper we apply Girsanov’s measure transformation, which allows
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6us to derive the stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum principle, for decentralized noiseless feedback
information structures, instead of nonanticipative (open loop) information structures adapted to
a sub-filtration of the fixed filtration generated by the Brownian motion {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
(e.g., ut = µ(t,W )) considered in [46]. Since feedback strategies are more desirable compared
to nonanticipative strategies, this paper is an improvement to [46]. The only disadvantage is that,
unlike [46], we cannot allow dependence of the diffusion coefficient σ on the team decisions. The
current paper also generalizes some of the results on centralized partial information optimality
conditions derived in [47] to centralized partial feedback information. We note that the case
of decentralized noisy information structures is treated in [48], and therefore by combining
the results of this paper with those in [48], we can handle any combination of decentralized
noiseless and noisy information structures. However, when applying the optimality conditions
to determine the optimal team strategies, the main challenge is the computation of conditional
expectations with respect to the information structures. The procedure is similar to [49], where
various examples from the communication and control areas are presented, using decentralized
nonanticipative strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the stochastic
differential team problem and its equivalent re-formulations using the weak Girsanov measure
transformation approach. Here, we also establish the connection between Girsanov’s theorem
and Witsenhausen’s “Common Denominator Condition” and “Change of Variables” [18] for
stochastic continuous-time and discrete-time dynamical systems. Further, we derive the varia-
tional equation which we invoke in Section III, to derive the optimality conditions, both under
the reference probability measure and under the initial probability measure. In Section IV we
provide concluding remarks and comments on future work.
II. EQUIVALENT STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC TEAM PROBLEMS
In this section, we consider the stochastic dynamic team problem (1)-(4), and we apply
Girsanov’s theorem, to transformed it to an equivalent team problem under a reference prob-
ability measure, in which the information structures are functionals of Brownian motion, and
hence independent of any of the team decisions. We will also briefly discuss the discrete-time
counterpart of Girsanov’s theorem, and we will show its equivalence to Witsenhausen’s so-called
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7“Common Denominator Condition” and “Change of Variables” discussed in [18].
Let
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
denote a complete filtered probability space satisfying the
usual conditions, that is, (Ω,F,P) is complete, F0,0 contains all P-null sets in F. Note that
filtrations {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} are mononote in the sense that F0,s ⊆ F0,t, ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
Moreover, we assume throghout that filtrations {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} are right continuous, i.e.,
F0,t = F0,t+
△
=
⋂
s>t F0,s, ∀t ∈ [0, T ). We define FT
△
= {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}. Consider a random
process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} taking values in (Z,B(Z)), where (Z, d) is a metric space, defined
on the filtered probability space (Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P). The process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is
said to be (a) measurable, if the map (t, ω) → z(t, ω) is B([0, T ]) × F/B(Z)−measurable, (b)
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted, if for all t ∈ [0, T ], the map ω → z(t, ω) is F0,t/B(Z)−measurable,
(c) {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−progressively measurable if for all t ∈ [0, T ], the map (s, ω)→ z(s, ω) is
B([0, t])⊗F0,t/B(Z)−measurable. It can be shown that any stochastic process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P) which is measurable and adapted has a
progressively measurable modification. Unless otherwise specified, we shall say a process {z(t) :
t ∈ [0, T ]} is {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted if the processes is {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−progressively
measurable [7].
We use the following notation.
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATION
ZN
△
= {1, 2, . . . , N}: Subset of natural numbers.
s
△
= {s1, s2, . . . , . . . , sN}: Set consisting of N elements.
s−i = s \ {si}, s = (s−i, si): Set s minus {si}.
L(X ,Y): Linear transformation mapping a vector space X
into a vector space Y .
A(i): ith column of a map A ∈ L(Rn,Rm), i = 1, . . . , n.
Ai ⊆ Rdi : Action spaces of controls applied at the ith control
station, i = 1, . . . , N .
Let C([0, T ],Rn) denote the space of continuous real-valued n−dimensional functions defined
on the time interval [0, T ], and B(Rn) its canonical Borel filtration.
Let L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) ⊂ L2(Ω × [0, T ], dP × dt,Rn) ≡ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denote the space
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8of FT−adapted random processes {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|z(t)|2Rndt <∞,
which is a Hilbert subspace of L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)).
Similarly, let L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)) ⊂ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,L(Rm,Rn))) denote the space of FT−adapted
n×m matrix valued random processes {Σ(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|Σ(t)|2L(Rm,Rn)dt
△
= E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt <∞.
Let B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) denote the space of FT -adapted Rn− valued second order random
processes endowed with the norm topology ‖ · ‖ defined by
‖ φ ‖2
△
= sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|φ(t)|2Rn.
Next, we introduce conditions on the coefficients {f, σ, hi, i = 1, . . . , N}, which are partly
used to derive the results of this section.
Assumptions 1. (Main assumptions) The drift f , diffusion coefficients σ, and information func-
tional hi are Borel measurable maps:
f : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn −→ L(Rn,Rn),
hi : [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rn) −→ Rki, ∀i ∈ ZN .
Moreover,
(A0) Ai ⊆ Rdi is nonempty, ∀i ∈ ZN .
There exists a K > 0 such that
(A1) |f(t, x, u)|Rn ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd), ∀t ∈ [0, T ];
(A2) |σ(t, x)|L(Rn,Rn) ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn), ∀t ∈ [0, T ];
(A3) |σ(t, x)− σ(t, y)|L(Rn,Rn) ≤ K|x− y|Rn, ∀t ∈ [0, T ];
(A4) σ(t, x) is invertible ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn;
(A5) |σ−1(t, x)f(t, x, u)|2Rn < K, uniformly in (t, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × A(N);
(A6) |σ(t, x)|L(Rn,Rn) ≥ K(1 + |x|qRn), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], q ≥ 1;
(A7) |σ−1(t, x)f(t, x, u)|Rn ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd), ∀t ∈ [0, T ];
(A8) |σ−1(t, x)f(t, x, u)− σ−1(t, z)f(t, z, v)|Rn ≤ (1 + |x− z|Rn + |u− v|Rd).
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9A. Equivalent Stochastic Team Problems via Girsanov’s
Next, we define the dynamic team problem (1)-(4) using the weak Girsanov’s change of
measure approach.
We start with a canonical space
(
Ω,F,P
)
on which (x0, {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}) are defined by
(WP1) x(0) = x0: an Rn-valued Random Variable with distribution Π0(dx);
(WP2) {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an Rm-valued standard Brownian motion, independent of x(0);
We introduce the Borel σ−algebra B(C[0, T ],Rn)) on C([0, T ],Rn) generated by {W (t) : 0 ≤
t ≤ T}, and let PW its Wiener mesure on it. Further, we introduce the filtration FWT
△
= {FW0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]} generated by truncations of W ∈ C([0, T ],Rn). That is, FW0,t is the sub-σ-algebra
generated by the family of sets{
{W ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) : W (s) ∈ A} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t, A ∈ B(Rn)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], (6)
which implies {FW0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the canonical Borel filtration, FW0,T = B(C[0, T ],Rn)), and
FW0,t = Bt(C[0, T ],R
n)) are the truncations for t ∈ [0, T ]. Next, we define
Ω
△
=Rn × C([0, T ],ℜn), F
△
= B(Rn)⊗ B(C([0, T ],Rn)),
F0,t
△
=B(Rn)⊗FW0,t , P
△
= Π0 × P
W .
On the probability space (Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P) we define the stochastic differential equation
dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dW (t), x(0) = x0. t ∈ (0, T ]. (7)
Then by Assumptions 1, (A2), (A3), and for any initial condition satisfying E|x(0)|qRn , q ≥ 1,
(7) has a unique strong solution [17], x(·) ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) − P − a.s. adapted to the filtration
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and x(·) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)).
We also introduce the σ−algebra Fx0,t defined by
Fx0,t
△
= σ
{
{x ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) : x(s) ∈ A} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t, A ∈ B(Rn)
}
≡ Bt(C([0, T ],R
n)). (8)
Hence, FxT
△
= {Fx0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the canonical Borel filtration generated by x(·) ∈ C([0, T ],Rn)−
P− a.s. satisfying (7). From (7), and the additional Assumptions 1, (A4) on σ, it can be shown
that Fx0,t = F0,t ≡ Fx(0)
∨
FW0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and this σ−algebra is independent of any of the team
decisions u. Unlike [46], where we utilize open loop or nonanticipative information structures,
here we use feedback information structures. Note that for the feedback information structures to
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be independent of any of the team decisions u, it is necessary that under the reference probability
measure, P the state process x(·) is independent of u, which is indeed the case because we have
restricted the class of diffusion coefficients σ to those which are independent of u.
Next we prepare to define three sets of admissible team strategies. We define the Borel
σ−algebras generated by projections of x ∈ Rn on any of its subspaces say, xi △= Πi(x),
and the distributed observations process {zi(t) △= hi(t, x) : t ∈ [0, T ]} as follows.
Gx
i(t) △=σ
{
{xi ∈ C([0, T ],Rni) : xi(t) ∈ A} : A ∈ B(Rni)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN (9)
Gz
i
0,t
△
=zi,−1
(
Bt([0, T ])⊗ Bt(C([0, T ],R
n))
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (10)
Further, define GziT
△
= {Gz
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},G
zi
0,t ⊆ F
x
0,t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]}, the canonical Borel filtration
generated by {zi(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, for i = 1, . . . , N . Define the delayed sharing information
structure at the ith control station by GIiT
△
= {GI
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, which is the minimum filtration
generated by the Borel σ−algebra at the ith observation post {zi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and the
delayed sharing information signaling,
{
zj(s − ǫj) : ǫj > 0, j ∈ O(i), 0 ≤ s ≤ t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ],
from the observation posts O(i) ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N}, to the control station i, for
i = 1, . . . , N .
Next, we define the three classes of information structures we consider in this paper.
Definition 1. (Noiseless Feedback Admissible Strategies)
Without Signaling: If there is no signaling from the observation posts to any of the other
control stations, the set of admissible strategies at the ith control station is defined by
Uz
i
[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Ai ⊆ Rdi :
ui is {Gzi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−Progressively Measurable (PM)
and E
∫ T
0
Λu(t)|ut|
2
Rddt <∞
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (11)
A team strategy is an N tuple defined by (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N),z[0, T ] △= ×Ni=1Uzi[0, T ].
With Signaling: If there is delayed sharing information signaling from the other observation
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posts, the set of admissible strategies at the ith control station is defined by
UI
i
[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Ai ⊆ Rdi :
ui is {GIi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−PM and E
∫ T
0
Λu(t)|ut|
2
Rddt <∞
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (12)
A team strategy is an N defined by (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)[0, T ] △= ×Ni=1UIi [0, T ].
Without Perfect Recall ∼ Markov: If the distributed observation process collected at the
ith observation post is zi = xi, and there is no perfect recall, the set of admissible strategies at
the ith control station is defined by
Ux
i
[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui : [0, T ]× Rni −→ Ai ⊆ Rdi :
for any t ∈ [0, T ], uit is Gxi(t)−measurable and E
∫ T
0
Λu(t)|ut|
2
Rddt <∞
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN .
(13)
A team strategy is an N defined by (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N),x[0, T ] △= ×Ni=1Uxi[0, T ].
The results derived in this paper hold for other variations of the information structures, such
as, control stations without perfect recall based on delayed information Gxi(t−δi), δi ≥ 0, i =
1, . . . , N , etc.
The reason for imposing the condition E
∫ T
0
Λu(t)|ut|
2
Rddt < ∞ will be clarified shortly.
Thus, an admissible strategy, say, u ≡ (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)[0, T ] is a family of N functions, say,(
µ1t (·), µ
2
t (·), . . . , µ
N
t (·)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], which are progressively measurable (nonanticipative) with
respect to the delayed sharing noiseless feedback information structure {GIi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i =
1, 2, . . . , N .
Next, for any u ∈ U(N)[0, T ] (we can also consider U(N),z[0, T ],U(N),x[0, T ]) we define on(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
the exponential function
Λu(t)
△
= exp
{∫ t
0
f ∗(s, x(s), us)a
−1(s, x(s))dx(s)
−
1
2
∫ t
0
f ∗(s, x(s))a−1(s, x(s))f(s, x(s))ds
}
, a(t, x) = σ(t, x)σ∗(t, x), t ∈ [0, T ]. (14)
Under the additional Assumptions 1, (A5), by Itoˆ’s differential rule {Λu(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} it is the
unique {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted, P−a.s. continuous solution [17] of the stochastic differential
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equation
dΛu(t) = Λu(t)f ∗(t, x(t), ut)a
−1(t, x(t))dx(t), Λu(0) = 1. (15)
Given any u ∈ U(N)[0, T ] we define the reward of the team game under
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]},P
)
by
J(u∗)
△
= inf
u∈U(N)[0,T ]
E
{∫ T
0
Λu(t)ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ Λ
u(T )ϕ(x(T )
}
, (16)
where ℓ : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ (−∞,∞], ϕ : [0, T ]×Rn −→ (−∞,∞] will be such that (16)
is finite.
For any admissible strategy u ∈ U(N)[0, T ], by Assumptions 1, (A5), Novikov condition [17]
E exp
{1
2
∫ t
0
|σ−1(s, x(s))f(s, x(s), us)|
2
Rnds
}
<∞, (17)
which is sufficient for {Λu(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} defined by (14) to be an
(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
-
martingale, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus, by the martingale property, Λu(·) has constant expectation,∫
Ω
Λu(t, ω)dP(ω) = 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and therefore, we can utilize Λu(·) which represents a version
of the Radon-Nikodym derivative, to define a probability measure Pu on
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈
[0, T ]}
)
by setting
dPu
dP
∣∣∣
F0,t
= Λu(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (18)
Moreover, by Girsanov’s theorem under the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, the
process {W u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a standard Brownian motion and it is defined by
W u(t)
△
= W (t)−
∫ t
0
σ−1(s, x(s))f(s, x(s), us)ds, (19)
t ∈ [(0, T ], and the distribution of x(0) is unchanged.
Therefore, under Assumptions 1, (A1)-(A5) we have constructed the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, the Brownian motion {W u(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined on it, and the state process
x(·) which is a weak solution of
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW
u(t), x(0) = x0, (20)
t ∈ (0, T ], unique in probability law defined via (18), having the properies x(·) ∈ C([0, T ],Rn)−
Pu − a.s., it is {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted, and x(·) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)).
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By substituting (18) into (16), under the probability measure Pu, the team game reward is given
by
J(u∗) = inf
u∈U(N)[0,T ]
Eu
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ ϕ(x(T ))
}
. (21)
From the definition of the Radon-Nikodym derivative (18), for any admissible strategy, say,
u ∈ U(N)[0, T ] we also have E
∫ T
0
Λu(t)|ut|
2
Rddt = E
u
∫ T
0
|ut|
2
Rddt <∞.
Note that if we start with the stochastic dynamic team problem (20), (21), the reverse change
of measure is obtained as follows. Define
ρu(T )
△
= Λu,−1(t) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
f ∗(s, x(s), us)σ
−1(s, x(s))dW u(s)
−
1
2
∫ t
0
|
(
σ(s, x(s))
)−1
f(s, x(s), us)|Rnds
}
. (22)
Then EΛu(t) = Euρu(t)Λu(t) = 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and dP
dPu
∣∣∣
F0,t
= ρu(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. Conse-
quently, under the reference measure
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
the stochastic dynamic team
problem is (7), (15), (16).
Remark 1. We have shown that under the Assumptions 1, (A1)-(A5), and E|x(0)|Rn < ∞,
for any u ∈ U(N)[0, T ] then E
(
Λu(t)
)
= 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and that we have two equivalent
formulations of the stochastic dynamic team problem.
(1) Under the original probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
the dynamic team
problem is described by the pay-off (21), and the {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted continuous strong
solution x(·) satisfying (20), where the distributed observations collected at the observation posts
{zi(t) = hi(t, x) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are affected by the team decisions via {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
(2) Under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
the dynamic team
problem is described by the pay-off (16), and the {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted continuous pathwise
solution of (x(·),Λ(·)), satisfying (7), (15), where {zi(t) = hi(t, x) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is not affected
by any of the team decisions. Note that strong uniqueness holds for solutions of (7), (15) because
both satisfy the Lipschitz conditions (i.e. Assumptions 1, (A3), (A5) hold).
Remark 2. The Assumptions 1, (A5) is satisfied if the following alternative conditions hold.
(A5)(a) (A4), (A6) holds and either (i) (A1) is replaced by |f(t, x, u)|Rn ≤ K(1+|x|Rn), K >
0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], or (ii) A(N) is bounded;
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Remark 3. The Girsanov’s measure transformation is precisely the continuous-time counterpart
of so called “Common Denominator Condition and Change of Variables” (i.e. [Sections 4, 5,
[18]]), of Witsenhausen’s discrete-time stochastic control problems with finite decisions. Wit-
senhausen in [18] called any discrete-time stochastic dynamical decentralized decision problem
which can be transformed via the “Common Denominator Condition and Change of Variables”
to observations which are not affected by any of the team decisions “Static”. The main point
we wish to make regarding [18] is the following.
Contrary to the belief in [18], and although the distributed observations and information
structures of the equivalent stochastic team decision problem, under the reference probability
measure P, are not affected by any of the team decisions, this does not mean than Marschak’s and
Radner’s [13]–[15] static team theory optimality conditions can be easily applied to compute
the optimal team strategies of the equivalent team problem. We further elaborate on this point
in Section II-B.
The main problem with developing the team and PbP optimality conditions based on variational
methods, under the original probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, is the definition
of admissible strategies, which states that {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]} is adapted to feedback information
{GI
i
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} ⊂ {F
x
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, . . . , N , and hence affected by the team decisions.
Therefore, if one invokes weak or needle variations of u ∈ U(N)[0, T ], to compute the Gateaux
derivative of the pay-off, then one needs the variational equation of the unobserved state x(·)
satisfying (21), which implies that one should differentiate {uit ≡ µ(t, I i) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i =
1, . . . , N with respect to x, because {I1(t), . . . , IN(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are affected by the decisions.
Therefore, the classical methods which assume nonanticipative strategies adapted to {FW0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]} [7] or any sub-σ−algebra of this [47], in general do not apply. One approach to
circumvent this technicality is to show that feedback strategies are dense in noanticipatve or
open loop strategies, and the pay-off is continuously dependent on u ∈ U(N)[0, T ] as in [46].
Another approach is to use Girsanov’s theorem.
Before we proceed we show, in the next theorem, that Girsanov’s change of probability
measure, which is based on identifying sufficient conditions so that {Λu(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is
an
(
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
-martingale, holds under more general conditions than the uniform
bounded condition given by Assumptions 1, (A5).
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Theorem 1. (Equivalence of Dynamic Team Problems)
Suppose E|x(0)|Rn < ∞, Assumptions 1, (A1), (A2), (A7), hold, and consider any of the
admissible strategies of Definition 1.
Then E
(
Λu(t)
)
= 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and the dynamic team problem with pay-off (21) subject to
x(·) satisfying (20) is equivalent to the dynamic team problem with pay-off (16) with (x(·),Λ(·))
satisfying (7), (15).
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus, Theorem 1 is a significant generalization of the equivalence between the two stochastic
team problems.
B. Function Space Integration: Equivalence of Static and Dynamic Team Problems
In this section, we show the precise connection between Girsanov’s measure transformation
and Witsenhausen’s “Common Denominator Condition and Change of Variables” [18], for the
continuous-time stochastic dynamic team problem (1)-(4), and for general discrete-time stochastic
dynamic team problems.
Continuous-Time Stochastic Dynamic Team Problems.
For simplicity we introduce the following assumptions.
Assumptions 2. The Borel measurable diffusion coefficient σ in (20) is replaced by1
(A9) G : [0, T ] −→ L(Rn,Rn) (i.e. it is independent of (x, u) ∈ Rn × A(N)), G−1 exists and
both are uniformly bounded;
(A10) E|x(0)|Rn <∞ and Assumptions 1, (A1) hold.
Under Assumptions 2, by Theorem 1 we can apply Girsanov’s theorem to obtain the equivalent
stochastic dynamic team problem under the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, such
1G can be allowed to depend on x.
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that {(x(t),Λu(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is defined by
x(t) =x(0) +
∫ t
0
G(s)dW (s) ≡ x(0) + Ŵ (t),
Λu(t) =1 +
∫ t
0
f ∗(s, x(s), us)
(
G(s)G∗(s)
)−1
dx(s), (23)
where {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a standard Brownian motions, and for any u ∈ U(N)[0, T ] the the
pay-off givan is
J(u)
△
= E
{∫ T
0
Λu(t)ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ Λ
u(T )ϕ(x(T )
}
. (24)
Note that in (24), E{·} denotes expectation with respect to the product measure P(dξ, dw) △=
Π0(dξ)×WŴ (dw), where WŴ (·) is the Wiener measure on the Brownian motion sample paths
{Ŵ (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} ∈ C([0, T ],Rn).
Now, we consider the equivalent transformed pay-off (24), and integrate by parts the stochastic
integral term appearing in Λu(·), and then we define
ℓ(t, ξ, Ŵ , u)
△
= Λuℓ(t, x, u), ϕ(T, ξ, Ŵ , u)
△
= Λuϕ(x). (25)
Then the transformed pay-off (24) is given by
J(u)
△
=
∫
Rn×C([0,T ],Rn)
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, ξ, {Ŵ (s), us : 0 ≤ s ≤ t})dt
+ ϕ(T, ξ, {Ŵ (t), ut : 0 ≤ t ≤ T})
}
W
Ŵ
(dŴ )× Π0(dξ) (26)
Note that the equivalent pay-off (26) is expressed as a function space integral with respect to a
Wiener measure. Such function space integrations are discussed in nonlinear mean-square error
nonlinear filtering problems in [50], [51]. Moreover, expression (26) is precisely the continuous-
time analog of Witsenhausen’s main theorem [Theorem 6.1, [18]], which is easily verified by
comparing (26) and [equation (6.4), [18]]. In fact, Λu(·) is the common denominator condition,
and the representation of the pay-off as a functional of ω(t) = (x(0),W (t) △= x(0) + Ŵ (t)), t ∈
[0, T ], is the change of variables. Since (26) is a functional of (x(0), Ŵ (·), u1, . . . , uN) and ui’s
are not affected by any of the team decisions, because uit = µit(I i), and I i(·) are functionals of
(x(0), Ŵ (·)), then we can proceed further to derive team optimality conditions using static team
theory, by computing the Gateaux derivative of (26) at ui,o in the direction of ui−ui,o, i = 1, . . .,
as in [14], [16]. However, for complicated problems this procedure might not be tractable even
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for the simplified case ℓ = 0, because it will involve function space integrations with respect to
the Wiener measure.
Discrete-Time Stochastic Dynamic Team Problems.
Next, we consider a discrete-time generalized version of the stochastic differential decen-
tralized decision problem (23), (24), under the reference probability measure P. Let N0 △=
{0, 1, 2, . . .},N1
△
= {1, 2, . . .} denote time-index sets.
We start with a reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,n : n ∈ N0},P
)
, under which {x(n) :
n ∈ N0} is a sequences of independent RVs, having Normal densities denoted by λn(·) ∼
N(0, G(n)G∗(n)), for n ∈ N1, x(0) ∼ Π0(dx), {F0,n : n ∈ N0} is the filtration generated
by the completion of the σ−algebra σ{x(k) : k ≤ n}, n ∈ N0, and {Gz
i
0,n : n ∈ N0} is the
filtration generated by the completion of the σ−algebra σ{zi(k) △= hi(k, x(0), x(1), . . . , x(k)) :
k ≤ n}, n ∈ N0, i = 1, . . . , N .
Next, we define the team strategies which donot assume “Perfect Recall”. Suppose for each
n ∈ N0, ui(n) ∈ Ain, and that ui(n) is measurable with respect to E in ⊂
∨N
i=1 G
zi
0,n, where E in
is not nested, for i = 1, . . . , N , that is, E in * E in+1, n = 0, 1, . . ., and hence all control station
donot have perfect recall. For each n ∈ N0, such information structures can be generated by
E in
△
= σ
{
Πin
(
{zj(0), zj(1), . . . , zj(n) : j = 1, . . . , N}
)}
, where Πin(·) is the projection to a
subset of {zj(0), zj(1), . . . , zj(n) : j = 1, . . . , N}, for i = 1, . . . , N .
We denote the set of admissible strategies at the ith control station at time n ∈ N0, by γin(·) ∈
Ui[n], their T−tuple by γi[0,T−1](·)
△
= (γi0(·), . . . , γ
i
T−1(·)) ∈ U
i[0, T − 1]
△
= ×T−1j=0 U
i[j], i =
1, . . . , N , and γ[0,T−1](·)
△
= (γ1[0,T−1], . . . , γ
N
[0,T−1](·) ∈ U
(N)[0, T − 1]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i[0, T − 1].
Consider the following measurable functions.
f(k, ·, ·) : ×ki=0(R
n)×N,ki=1,j=0 (A
i
j) −→ R
n, k ∈ N0,
hi(k, ·) : ×ki=0(R
n) −→ Rki , k ∈ N0, i = 1, . . . , N.
For any admissible decentralized strategy u ≡ γ[0,T−1] ∈ U(N)[0, T − 1], we define the following
quantity.
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Λu0,n+1
△
=
n∏
k=0
λk+1(x(k + 1)− f(k, x(0), x(1), . . . , x(k), u(k)))
λk+1(x(k + 1))
,
Λu0,0 =1, n ∈ Z+. (27)
Under the reference probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,n : n ∈ N0},P
)
, define the team pay-off
J(u) =E
{
Λu0,T (x(0), u(0), . . . , x(T − 1), u(T − 1), x(T ))
( T−1∑
k=0
ℓ(k, x(k), u(k)) + ϕ(x(T ))
)}
(28)
=
∫ {
Λu0,T (x(0), u(0), . . . , x(T − 1), u(T − 1), x(T ))
( T−1∑
k=0
ℓ(k, x(k), u(k)) + ϕ(x(T ))
)}
T−1∏
k=0
λk+1(x(k + 1))dx(k + 1)Π0(dx(0)) (29)
≡
∫
L(γ[0,T−1], x(0), x(1), . . . , x(T )).
T−1∏
k=0
λk+1(x(k + 1))dx(k + 1)Π0(dx(0)) ≡ J(γ[0,T−1]).
(30)
Clearly, the problem
inf
{
J(γ[0,T−1]) : γ[0,T−1] ∈ U
(N)[0, T − 1]
}
, (31)
is a static team problem, because the information structure available for decisions are nonlinear
measurable functions of (x(0), . . . , x(T )), which are not affected by any of the team decisions.
This is the transformed equivalent stochastic team problem of a certain stochastic dynamic team
problem which we introduce next.
Since it can be shown that {Λu0,n : n ∈ N0} is an
(
Ω,F, {F0,n : n ∈ N0},P
)
−martingale, with∫
Λu0,n(ω)dP(ω) = 1, then we can define the probability measure Pu on
(
Ω, {F0,n : n ∈ N0}
)
by setting
dPu
dP
∣∣∣
F0,n
= Λu(n), ∀n ∈ N0. (32)
Then under this probability measure Pu, the process defined by
wu(n+ 1)
△
= x(n + 1)− f(n, x(0), . . . , x(n), u(n)), n ∈ N0, (33)
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is a sequences of independent normally distributed RVs with densities, λn(·), n ∈ N1. Therefore,
under the probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,n : n ∈ Z+},Pu
)
, we have
x(n + 1) =f(n, x(0), . . . , x(n), u(n)) + wu(n+ 1), (34)
zi(n) =hi(n, x(0), . . . , x(n)), n ∈ N0, i = 1, . . . , N. (35)
Then, for any admissible discrete-time team strategy u ≡ γ[0,T−1] ∈ UN [0, T −1], under measure
Pu the team pay-off is
J(u) = Eu
{ T−1∑
k=0
ℓ(k, x(k), u(k)) + ϕ(x(T ))
}
. (36)
Thus, we have shown that the dynamic team problem of minimizing pay-off (36), subject
to (34), (35) can be transformed to the equivalent static team problem defined by pay-off
(31), where {x(n) : n ∈ N0} is an independent sequence, distributed according to x(0) ∼
Π0(·), {λn+1(·) : n ∈ N0}, and the information structures are functions of the independent
sequence {x(n) : n ∈ N0}.
Consequently, we have identified the precise connection between the so-called “Common Denom-
inator Conditions and Change of Variables” described by Witsenhausen in [18]), for a discrete-
time stochastic dynamic team problem to be equivalent to a static team problem.
Therefore, we conclude that the static team theory by Marschak and Radner [13], [14] and
its generalization in [16], are directly applicable to the transformed problem (31), in a higher
dimension consisting of TN decision strategies (because we have assumed no perfect recall of
information at all control stations). Thus, any of the theorems found in [16] are applicable.
Finally, we make the following observations.
Remark 4. The Girsanov theorem is also applicable to more general models that (34) such as,
x(n+1) = f(n, x(0), . . . , x(n), u(n), w(n+1)), where {w(n) : n ∈ N1} is arbitrary distributed,
and to finite and countable state Markov decision models. It is also applicable to stochastic
dynamic team games with noisy information such as, zi(n) = hi(n, x(0), . . . , x(n), u(n), vi(n)),
where {vi(n) : n ∈ N0}, i = 1, . . . , N are arbitrary distributed.
C. Continuous Dependence of Solutions and Semi Martingale Representation
In this section, we show under appropriate conditions, that (15) has unique continuous solutions
(in the strong sense) with finite second moments, and that any solution is continuously dependent
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on u. These properties are required in the derivation of necessary conditions for team and PbP
optimality of the equivalent transformed team problem.
Lemma 1. (Existence and Differentiability) Suppose Assumptions 1, (A2)-(A5) hold. Then for
any F0,0-measurable initial state x0 having finite second moment, and any u ∈ U(N)[0, T ], the
following hold.
(1) (7), (15) have unique solutions x ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)), Λu ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,R))
having a continuous modifications, that is, Λu ∈ C([0, T ],R), P−a.s. Moreover, Λu ∈ Lp(Ω, {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]},P;R) for any finite p, and also Λu ∈ L∞(Ω, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P;R)
(2) Under the additional Assumptions 1, (A8), the solution of (15) is continuously dependent
on the decisions, in the sense that, as ui,α −→ ui,o in UIi[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , Λα
s
−→ Λo in
B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)).
Proof: (1). The uniqueness of solution having a continuous modification is already discussed
in Section II-A, and it is based on Assumptions 1, (A2)-(A5). The rest of the claims are shown
by following the method in [48].
(2) Next, we consider the second part asserting the continuity of u to solution map u −→ Λu Let
{{ui,α : i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, uo} be any pair of strategies from U(N)[0, T ]×U(N)[0, T ] and {Λα,Λo}
denote the corresponding pair of solutions of (15). Let ui,α −→ ui,o in Ui[0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
We must show that Λα −→ Λo in B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)). By the definition of solution to (15),
we have
Λα(t)− Λo(t) =
∫ t
0
{
Λα(s)− Λo(s)
}
f ∗(s, x(s), uos)a
−1(s, x(s))dx(s)
+
∫ t
0
Λα(s)
{
f ∗(s, x(s), uαs )− f
∗(s, x(s), uos)
}
a−1(s, x(s))dx(s), (37)
where a △= σσ∗, and {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the solution of (7). From (37) using Doobs martingale
inequality we obtain
E|Λα(t)− Λo(t)|2 ≤ 4E
∫ t
0
|Λα(s)− Λo(s)|2|σ−1(s, x(s))f(s, x(s), uos)|
2
Rnds
+ 4E
∫ t
0
|Λα(s)|2|σ−1(s, x(s))(f(s, x(s), uαs (s))− f(s, x(s), u
o
s))|
2
Rnds (38)
≤ 4K1E
∫ t
0
|Λα(s)− Λo(s)|2ds+ 4K2E
∫ t
0
|Λα(s)|2|uαs − u
o
s|
2
Rdds, t ∈ [0, T ], (39)
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where (39) follows from (A5), (A8), with K1, K2 > 0.
Since by part (1), P − ess supω∈Ω supt∈[0,T ] |Λα(t, ω)|2 < M for some finite M > 0, applying
this in (39) we deduce the following bound.
E|Λα(t)− Λo(t)|2 ≤ 4K1E
∫ t
0
|Λα(s)− Λo(s)|2ds+ 4MK2E
∫ t
0
|uαs − u
o
s|
2
Rdds, t ∈ [0, T ].
(40)
Now, letting α −→∞ and recalling that ui,α −→ ui,o in Ui[0, T ] the integrand in the second right
hand side of (40) converges to zero for almost all s ∈ [0, T ],P−a.s. Since by our assumptions
the integrands are dominated by integrable functions, we obtain by Gronwall’s inequality that
limα−→∞ supt∈[0,T ] E|Λ
α(t)− Λo(t)|2 = 0. This completes the derivation.
The derivation of stochastic minimum principle will be based on certain fundamental properties
of semi martingales on Hilbert spaces, which we describe below.
Definition 2. An Rn−valued random process {m(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is said to be a square integrable
continuous {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−semi martingale if and only if it has a representation
m(t) = m(0) +
∫ t
0
v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ], (41)
for some v ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],Rn) and Σ ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) and for some Rn−valued F0,0−measurable
random variable m(0) having finite second moment. The set of all such semi martingales is
denoted bu SM2[0, T ].
Introduce the following class of {F0,t : tı[0, T ]}−semi martingales:
SM20[0, T ]
△
=
{
m : m(t) =
∫ t
0
v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s),
t ∈ [0, T ], for v ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n),Σ ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn))
}
.
Now we present the fundamental result which is utilized in the maximum principle derivation.
Theorem 2. (Semi Martingale Representation) The class of semi martingales SM20[0, T ] is a
real linear vector space and it is a Hilbert space with respect to the norm topology ‖ m ‖SM20[0,T ]
arising from
‖ m ‖2
SM20[0,T ]
△
= E
∫
[0,T ]
|v(t)|2Rndt+ E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt.
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Moreover, the space SM20[0, T ] is isometrically isomorphic to the space L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) ×
L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn)).
Proof: This is found in many books.
III. DYNAMIC TEAM OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
In this section we derive the team and PbP optimality conditions, under the reference proba-
bility measure P, and then we translate the results under the original probability measure Pu. For
the derivation of stochastic optimality conditions we shall require stronger regularity conditions.
These are given below.
Assumptions 3. Ai is a closed, bounded and convex subset of Rdi , ∀i ∈ ZN , E|x(0)|2Rn < ∞,
the maps {f, σ, ℓ, ϕ} are Borel measurable, {hi : i = 1, . . . , N} are progressively measurable,
defined by
f : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn −→ L(Rn,Rn),
ϕ : Rn −→ R, ℓ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ R, hi : [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rn) −→ Rki,
and they satisfy the following conditions.
(C1) The map σ satisfies (A2), (A3), (A4) and the map σ−1f satisfies (A5);
(C2) The map f is once continuously differentiable with respect to u ∈ A(N), and the first
derivative of σ−1f with respect to is u is bounded uniformly in (t, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × A(N);
(C3) The maps ℓ is once continuously differentiable with respect to u ∈ A(N)), and there exists
a K > 0 such that(
1 + |x|2Rn + |u|
2
Rd
)−1
|ℓ(t, x, u)|R +
(
1 + |x|Rn + |u|Rd
)−1
|ℓu(t, x, u)|Rd ≤ K,(
1 + |x|2Rn|
)−1
|ϕ(x)|R ≤ K;
A. Necessary Conditions for Team Optimality
Next, we prepare to give the variational equation under the reference measure probability(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
. We define the Gateaux derivative of any matrix valued function
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G : [0, T ] × Rn × A(N) −→ L(Rn,Rm) with respect to the variable at the point (t, x, u) ∈
[0, T ]× Rn × A(N) in the direction v ∈ A(N) by
Gu(t, x, u; v)
△
= lim
ε−→0
1
ε
{
G(t, x, u+ εv)−G(t, x, u)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Clearly, for each column of G denoted by G(j), j = 1, . . . , n, the Gateaux derivative of G(j)
component wise is given by G(j)u (t, x, u; v) = G(j)u (t, x, u)v, t ∈ [0, T ].
Suppose uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)[0, T ] denotes the optimal decision and u △= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈
U(N)[0, T ] any other decision. Since UIi[0, T ] is convex ∀i ∈ ZN , it is clear that for any ε ∈ [0, 1],
ui,εt
△
= ui,ot + ε(u
i
t − u
i,o
t ) ∈ U
Ii[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Let Λε(·) ≡ Λε(·; uε(·)) and Λo(·) ≡ Λo(·; uo(·)) ∈ B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)) denote the solutions of
the differential system (15) corresponding to uε(·) and uo(·), respectively. Consider the limit
Z(t)
△
= lim
ε−→0
1
ε
{
Λε(t)− Λo(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Since under the reference probability measure, dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dW (t), x(0) = x0 then its
solution is not affected by uǫ, hence we do not consider any variations of x(·) with respect to
uǫ.
We have the following characterization of the variational process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Lemma 2. (Variational Equation) Suppose Assumptions 3 hold. The process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
is an element of the Banach space B∞FT ([0, T ], L2(Ω,R)) and it is the unique solution of the
variational stochastic differential equation
dZ(t) = f ∗(t, x(t), uot )σ
∗,−1(t, x(t))Z(t)dW (t)
+
N∑
i=1
(f ∗σ∗,−1)ui(t, x(t), u
o
t ; u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dW (t), Z(0) = 0. (42)
having a continuous modification.
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 1 and the fact that f ∗σ∗,−1 and its derivative with
respect to u are uniformly bounded.
Minimum Principle Under Reference Probability Space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
Next, we state the necessary conditions for team and PbP optimality under the reference prob-
ability measure.
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Define the Hamiltonian of the augmented system (7), (15), (16).
H : [0, T ]× Rn × R× L(Rn,R)× A(N) −→ R
H(t, x,Λ,Ψ, Q, u)
△
=ΛQσ−1(t, x)f(t, x, u) + Λℓ(t, x, u), t ∈ [0, T ]. (43)
For any u ∈ U(N)[0, T ], the adjoint process (Ψ, Q) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R) × L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rn,R))
satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equations
dΨ(t) =− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt−Q(t)σ
−1(t, x(t))f(t, x(t), ut) +Q(t)dW (t),
=−HΛ(t, x(t),Λ(t),Ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+ Q(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ), Ψ(T ) = ϕ(x(T )),
(44)
The state process satisfies the stochastic differential equation (15) expressed in terms of the
Hamiltonian as follows.
dΛ(t) = Λ(t)f ∗(t, x(t), ut)σ
∗,−1(t, x(t))dW (t),
=Λ(t)f ∗(t, x(t), ut)σ
∗,−1(t, x(t))dW (t), t ∈ (0, T ], Λ(0) = 1. (45)
Moreover, under measure P, the process {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is not affected by u ∈ U(N)[0, T ]
and satisfies
dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dW (t), t ∈ (0, T ], x(0) = x0 (46)
Next, we state the the necessary conditions for an element uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] to be team optimal.
Theorem 3. (Necessary Conditions for Team Optimality under Reference Measure)
Suppose Assumptions 3 hold. Then we have the following..
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] with the corresponding solution Λo ∈
B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale mo ∈ SM20[0, T ] (1-dimensional) with the intensity process
(Ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R)× L
2
FT ([0, T ],L(R
n,R)).
(2) The variational inequalities are satisfied:
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
H(t, x(t),Λo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)dt
}
≥
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
H(t, x(t),Λo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i,o
t ))dt
}
, ∀u ∈ U(N)[0, T ], (47)
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E
{∫ T
0
H(t, x(t),Λo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)dt
}
≥ E
{∫ T
0
H(t, x(t),Λo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i,o
t ))dt
}
, ∀ui ∈ UI
i
[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (48)
(3) The process (Ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rn,R)) is a unique solution of the
backward stochastic differential equation (44) such that uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] satisfies the point wise
almost sure inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras GIi0,t ⊂ F0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N :
E
{
H(t, x(t),Λo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)|G
Ii
0,t
}
≥ E
{
H(t, x(t),Λo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
Ii
0,t
}
, ∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|
GI
i
0,t
− a.s., ∀i ∈ ZN .
(49)
(4) For admissible strategies U(N),z[0, T ],U(N),x[0, T ] the conditional expectation in (49) is
taken with respect to the information structures Gzi0,t,Gxi(t), respectively.
Proof: The derivation is based on the variation equation of Lemma 2, the semi martin-
gale representation theorem, and the Riesz representation theorem. We outline the steps. By
Assumptions 3, it can be shown that the Gateaux derivative of J(·) at uo in the direction u−uo
exists, and it is computed via d
dǫ
J(uo+ ǫ(u− uo))|ǫ=0. Using the semi martingale representation
and Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert space processes, we can show (1) and (2), (47),
following the steps in [47] or [Section V, [46]], for regular strategies. Moreover, (48) is obtained
by contradition. Finally, (3) is obtained precisely as in [46]. Finally, (4) follows from the fact
that the derivations of (1)-(3) do not depend on the form of the information structures generated
via zi, i = 1, . . . , N .
The important point to be made regarding Theorem 3 is that its derivation is based on
applying, under the new (reference) probability space
(
Ω,F,FT ,P
)
, any method based on strong
formulation (in our case [46], [47]), but with u adapted to feedback information.
We also point out that the necessary conditions for a uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] to be a PbP optimal can
be derived following the procedure described in Theorem 3, and that these necessary conditions
are equivalent to the necessary conditions for team optimality, as expected. These results are
stated as a Corollary.
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Corollary 1. (Necessary Conditions for PbP Optimality under Reference Measure)
Suppose Assumptions 3 hold. Then we have following.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] with the corresponding solution Λo ∈
B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,R)) to be a PbP optimal strategy, it is necessary that the statements of Theo-
rem 3, (1)-(4) hold, and statement (2) corresponding to (48).
Proof: The derivation is based on the procedure of Theorem 3, but we only vary in the
direction ui − ui,o, while the rest of the strategies are optimal, u−i = u−i,o.
Minimum Principle Under Original Probability Space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
Next, we express the optimality conditions with respect to the original probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t :
t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
.
Since the Hamiltonian under the reference probability measure (43), appearing in Theorem 3 is
multiplied by Λ(·), then we can write
H(t, x,Λ,Ψ, Q, u) = Λ
{
Qσ−1(t, x)f(t, x, u) + ℓ(t, x, u)
}
(50)
Define the Hamiltonian under the original probability measure Pu by
H : [0, T ]× Rn ×L(Rn,R)× A(N) −→ R
H(t, x, Q, u)
△
= ℓ(t, x, u) +Qσ−1(t, x)f(t, x, u). (51)
Since Λ(T ) = dPu
dP |FT , then we can express the Hamiltonian system of equations (44), (46) under
the original measure Pu, by translating the martingale term, using the fact that
W u(t)
△
= W (t)−
∫ t
0
σ−1(s, x(s))f(s, x(s), us)ds, is an
(
F0,t,P
u
)
−martingale. (52)
Thus, under the original probability measure
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},Pu
)
, by substituting (52)
into (44), (46) the adjoint process {Ψ(t), Q(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a solution of the backward and
forward stochastic differential equation
dΨ(t) = −ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW
u(t), Ψ(T ) = ϕ(x(T )), t ∈ [0, T ), (53)
and the process {x(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a solution of the following forward equation.
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW
u(t), x(0) = x0. (54)
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Moreover, the conditional variational Hamiltonian is given by
Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)|G
Ii
0,t
}
≥ Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i,o
t )|G
Ii
0,t
}
, ∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t, Pu
o
|
GI
i
0,t
− a.s., ∀i ∈ ZN . (55)
Hence, under the original probability space Pu, we have the following necessary conditions
for team optimality.
Theorem 4. (Necessary Conditions for Team Optimality under Original Measure)
Suppose Assumptions 3 hold. Then we have the following.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] with the corresponding solution xo ∈
B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale mo ∈ SM20[0, T ] (1-dimensional) with the intensity process
{(Ψo, Qo)} ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R)× L
2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rn,R)).
(2) The variational inequalities are satisfied:
N∑
i=1
Eu
o
{∫ T
0
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)dt
}
≥
N∑
i=1
Eu
o
{∫ T
0
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t)u−i,ot , u
i,o
t ))dt
}
, ∀u ∈ U(N)[0, T ]. (56)
Eu
o
{∫ T
0
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)dt
}
≥ Eu
o
{∫ T
0
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t)u−i,ot , u
i,o
t ))dt
}
, ∀ui ∈ UI
i
[0, T ]. (57)
(3) The process {(Ψo, Qo)} ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rn,R)) is a unique weak solution
of the backward stochastic differential equations (53) such that uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] satisfies the
point wise almost sure inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras GIi0,t ⊂ F0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i =
1, 2, . . . , N :
Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)|G
Ii
0,t
}
≥ Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
Ii
0,t
}
, ∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],Pu
o
|
GI
i
0,t
− a.s., ∀i ∈ ZN . (58)
(4) For admissible strategies U(N),z[0, T ],U(N),x[0, T ] the conditional expectation in (58) is
taken with respect to the information structures Gzi0,t,Gxi(t), respectively.
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Proof: The statements follow from Theorem 3, and the discussion prior to the Theorem.
For PbP optimality we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. (Necessary Conditions for PbP Optimality under Original Probability Meaure)
Suppose Assumptions 3 hold. Then we have the following.
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)[0, T ] with the corresponding solution xo ∈
B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) to be a PbP optimal strategy, it is necessary that the statements of
Theorem 4, (1), (3), (4) hold and statement (2) corresponding to (57).
Proof: Following from the change of probability measure and Corollary 1.
Therefore, we can apply the necessary conditions for team optimality, either under the reference
measure P or under original measure Pu.
In the next remark, we discuss the connection of Theorem 4 to the necessary conditions of
optimality of stochastic control problems with centralized feedback information structures.
Remark 5. From Theorem 4 one can deduce the optimality conditions of classical stochastic
control problems with centralized noiseless feedback information structures, that is, when for any
t ∈ [0, T ], ut is measurable with respect to the feedback information structure Fx0,t △= σ{x(s) :
0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and to partial noiseless feedback information structure Gx0,t ⊂ Fx0,t. Indeed, the
necessary conditions for such a uo to be optimal with say, centralized partial noiseless feedback
information structure, under the original probability measure Pu are
Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u)|Gx0,t
}
≥ Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
x
0,t
}
, ∀u ∈ A(N), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|u
o
Gx0,t
− a.s., (59)
where {xo(t),Ψo(t), Qo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are the solutions of (53), (54). Note that the Hamilto-
nian H(t, x, Q, u) ≡ Qσ−1(t, x)f(t, x, u) + ℓ(t, x, u) is precisely the one derived in [2], using
martingale methods.
Clearly, (59) generalizes the necessary conditions of optimality of classical stochastic control
problems with partial nonanticipative information structures [47], [52] and references therein,
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where for any t ∈ [0, T ], ut is measurable with respect to any Brownian motion generated,
sub−σ−algebras of GW0,t ⊂ FW0,t △= σ{W (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, t ∈ [0, T ].
B. Value Processes of Team Problems
In this section, we first show that the solution of the Backward stochastic differential equation
is the value process of the stochastic dynamic team problem, lifted to a conditioning with respect
to the centralized information structure. Then we use the lifted value process to show that the
necessary conditions (i.e. (58)) for PbP optimality are also sufficient.
Define the sample pay-off over the interval [t, T ] by
Jt,T (u
1, . . . , uN)
△
=
∫ T
t
ℓ(s, x(s), us)ds+ ϕ(x(T )). (60)
and its conditional expectation with respect to GIi0,t, i = 1, . . . , N , by
J it,T (u)
△
= Eu
{
Jt,T (u
1, . . . , uN)|GI
i
0,t
}
, u ∈ U(N)[t, T ], (61)
where U(N)[t, T ] is the restriction of the strategies U(N)[0, T ], to the interval [t, T ].
PbP optimality seeks admissible strategies ui ∈ UIi[t, T ], i = 1, . . . , N to minimize the pay-off,
in the sense,
Eu
−i,o,ui,o
{
Jt,T (u
−i,o, ui,o)|GI
i
0,t
}
≤ Eu
−i,o,ui
{
Jt,T (u
−i,o, ui)|GI
i
0,t
}
, ∀ui ∈ UI
i
[t, T ], i = 1, . . . , N.
This means that when team members employ strategies, u−i,o ∈ ×Nj=1, 6=iUI
j
[t, T ], team member
ui minimizes the reward Eu−i,o,ui
{
Jt,T (u
−i,o, ui)|GI
i
0,t
}
over all strategies UIi[0, T ]. The set of
all such strategies (u1,0, . . . , uN,0) ∈ ×Ni=1UI
i
[t, T ] is called PbP optimal.
We denote the value processes of the team game for each team member by
V i(t)
△
= Eu
−i,o,ui,o
{
Jt,T (u
−i,o, ui,o)|GI
i
0,t
}
, i = 1, . . . , N. (62)
Consider the solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (44)
Ψu(t) = Ψu(T ) +
∫ T
t
H(s, x(s), Qu(s), us)ds−
∫ T
t
Qu(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ). (63)
For u = uo this is the lifted value process of the team pay-off with respect to the information
F0,t, t ∈ [0, T ]. From (63) we have
Ψu(t) = Ψu(T ) +
∫ T
t
ℓ((s, x(s), us)ds−
∫ T
t
Qu(s)dW u(s), t ∈ [0, T ), (64)
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and by taking conditional expectation Eu
{
· |F0,t
}
of both sides of (64), and using Ψu(T ) =
ϕ(x(T )), we obtain
Ψu(t) = Eu
{∫ T
t
ℓ(s, x(s), us)ds+ ϕ(x(T ))|F0,t
}
. (65)
Hence,
J it,T (u) = E
u
{
Ψu(t)|GI
i
0,t
}
, u ∈ U(N)[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (66)
Now, we state the main theorem.
Theorem 5. (Sufficient Conditions for PbP Optimality) Let
(Ψu, Qu) ∈ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,R))× L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,L(Rn,R)))
be a solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (63).
If ui,o ∈ UIi[t, T ] satisfy the conditional variational inequalities (58), then (u1,o, . . . , uN.o) ∈
×Ni=1U
Ii[t, T ] is a PbP optimal.
Moreover, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],Pu−i,o,ui,o|
GI
i
0,t
−a.s. we have
V i(t) = Eu
−i,o,ui,o
{
Eu
−i,o,ui,o
{
Ψu
−i,o,ui,o(t)|F0,t
}
|GI
i
0,t
}
= Eu
−i,o,ui,o
{
Ψu
−i,o,ui,o(t)|GI
i
0,t
}
, i = 1, . . . , N.
(67)
Proof: Since (58) holds, by taking expectation on both sides we deduce
Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t)
}
≥ Eu
o
{
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), uot )
}
, ∀ui ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ ZN . This im-
plies that for almost every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rn),
H(t, xo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t) ≥ H(t, x
o(t), Qo(t), uot ), ∀u
i ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ ZN . (68)
Therefore, an application of the comparison theorem of stochastic differential equations [53]
to the second right hand side term of (63) yields Ψui,o,ui(·) ≥ Ψu−i,o,ui,o(·), a.e. on [0, T ] ×
C([0, T ],Rn). From (65), we have
Ψu
−i,o,ui,o(t) =Eu
−i,o,ui,o
{∫ T
t
ℓ(s, x(s), u−i,os , u
i,o
s )ds+ ϕ(x(T ))|F0,t
}
(69)
≤Ψu
−i,o,ui(t)
=Eu
−i,o,ui
{∫ T
t
ℓ(s, x(s), u−i,os , u
i
s)ds+ ϕ(x(T ))|F0,t
}
, ∀ui ∈ UI
i
[0, T ]. (70)
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By taking conditional expectation of both sides of last inequality with respect to GIi0,t, we obtain
Eu
−i,o,ui,o
{∫ T
t
ℓ(s, x(s), u−i,os , u
i,o
s )ds+ ϕ(x(T ))|G
Ii
0,t
}
≤ Eu
−i,o,ui
{∫ T
t
ℓ(s, x(s), u−i,os , u
i
s)ds
+ ϕ(x(T ))|GI
i
0,t
}
, ∀ui ∈ UI
i
[0, T ]. (71)
Since this hods for all i = 1, . . . , N we deduce PbP optimality.
Finally, by taking conditional expectation of both sides of (69) with respect to GIi0,t we deduce
(67). This completes the derivation.
Finally, we note that if we consider the extended state (x,Λ) and corresponding Hamiltonian
system of equations, under certain global convexity conditions (see [48]), we can show that PbP
optimality implies team optimality.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper generalizes static team theory to stochastic differential decision system with de-
centralized noiseless feedback information structures. We have applied Girsanov’s theorem to
transformed the initial dynamic team problem to an equivalent team problem, under a reference
probability space, with state process independent of any of the team decisions. Then, we described
the connection to static team theory discussed by Witsenhausen in [18], and we proceeded
further to derive team and PbP optimality conditions, using the stochastic Pontryagin’s maximum
principle. We also discussed the connection between the backward stochastic differential equation
and the value process of the team problem.
In future work we will apply the optimality conditions to problems from the communication
and control areas, as in [49], but instead of decentralized nonanticipative strategies, we will use
decentralized feedback strategies.
V. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1.
First, we show that E
{
Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
}
< K. By applying the Itoˆ differential rule
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d|x(t)|2Rn =2〈x(t), σ(t, x(t))dW (t)〉dt+ tr
(
a(t, x(t))
)
dt, a(t, x)
△
= σ(t, x)σ∗(t, x)
(72)
d
(
Λt|x(t)|
2
Rn
)
=Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rnf
∗(t, x(t), ut)
(
a(t, x(t))
)−1
dx(t) + 2Λu(t)〈x(t), σ(t, x(t))dW (t)〉
+ 2Λu(t)〈x(t), f(t, x(t), ut)〉+ Λ
u(t)tr
(
a(t, x(t))
)
dt. (73)
Then by applying the Itoˆ differential rule once more we have
d
Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
=
1(
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
)2{Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rnf ∗(t, x(t))(a(t, x(t)))−1dx(t)
+ 2Λu(t)〈x(t), σ(t, x(t))dW (t)〉+ 2Λu(t)〈x(t), f(t, x(t), ut)〉dt+ Λ
u(t)tr
(
a(t, x(t))
)
dt
}
−
ǫ(Λu(t))2(
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
)3{〈((a(t, x(t)))−1f(t, x(t), ut)|x(t)|2Rn
+ 2x(t), a(t, x(t))
((
a(t, x(t))
)−1
f(t, x(t), ut)|x(t)|
2
Rn + 2x(t)
)
〉
}
dt
Integrating over [0, T ] and taking the expectation with respect to P, and using the fact that
E
(
Λu(t)
)
≤ 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], yields
d
dt
E
{ Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
}
≤ E
{Λu(t)[2〈x(t), f(t, x(t), ut)〉+ tr(a(t, x(t)))]
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
}
. (74)
By Assumptions 1, (A1), (A2), there exists K > 0 such that
d
dt
E
{ Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
}
≤ K
(
E
{Λu(t)[|x(t)|2Rn + |ut|2Rd]
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
}
+ 1
)
Since for any u ∈ U(N)[0, T ], we have E
∫ T
0
Λu(t)|ut|
2
Rddt is finite, then it follows from Gronwall
inequality that
E
{ Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
1 + ǫΛu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
}
≤ C, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (75)
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By Fatou’s lemma we obtain E
{
Λu(t)|x(t)|2Rn
}
< C, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Consider
d
Λu(t)
1 + ǫΛu(t)
=
Λu(t)f ∗(t, x(t))
(
a(s, x(s))
)−1
dx(t)(
1 + ǫΛu(t)
)2
−
ǫ(Λu(t))2f ∗(t, x(t), ut)
(
a(t, x(t))
)−1
f(t, x(t), ut)(
1 + ǫΛu(t)
)3 ,
then
E
Λu(t)
1 + ǫΛu(t)
= 1− E
∫ t
0
ǫ(Λu(s))2f ∗(s, x(s), us)
(
a(t, x(t))
)−1
f(s, x(s), us)(
1 + ǫΛu(s)
)3 ds. (76)
Since
ǫ(Λu(t))2f ∗(t, x(t), ut)
(
a(t, x(t))
)−1
f(t, x(t), ut)(
1 + ǫΛu(t)
)3 −→ 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s. as ǫ −→ 0,
and by (A7) there exists a constant C > 0 such that it is bounded by CΛu(t)
(
1+|x(t)|2Rn+|ut|
2
Rd
)
,
then by the Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem we have
E
∫ t
0
ǫ(Λu(s))2f ∗(s, x(s), us)
(
a(s, x(s))
)−1
f(s, x(s), us)(
1 + ǫΛu(s)
)3 −→ 0 as ǫ −→ 0. (77)
Since E
(
Λu(t)
)
≤ 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] then by using (76) into (77), we obtain E Λu(t)
1+ǫΛu(t)
−→ EΛu(t),
as ǫ −→ 0. Hence, we must have EΛu(t) = 1, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Consequently, we have equivalence
of the two dynamic team problems.
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